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topicnews · September 14, 2024

Dan Goldfus: The general who captured Khan Yunis and destroyed Hamas tunnels

Dan Goldfus: The general who captured Khan Yunis and destroyed Hamas tunnels

There is a reason why new Major General Dan Goldfus of the Northern Corps and Multi-Domain Joint Maneuver Array is considered one of the IDF’s rising stars.

Brigadier General Itzik Cohen of the Israel Defense Forces’ 162nd Division, Brigadier General Dado Bar Kalifa of the 36th Division (who also became a major general, but in a less promotional position), Brigadier General Barak Hiram of the 99th Division, and Brigadier General Moran Omer of the 252nd Division all played important roles in the invasion of northern Gaza. So what’s so special about Goldfus?

One of the reasons that South African Goldfus – who was promoted from brigadier general to major general in May – is moving to the high command (others who held his next post went on to become IDF chief, IDF deputy chief and IDF intelligence chief) is that he is both the hero of Hamas’s defeat in Khan Yunis and the general who dismantled the terror group’s tunnel network.

How was Dan Goldfus able to overcome Hamas’ tunnel networks and defeat them in Khan Yunis?

The magazine has learned that Goldfus does not attribute his breakthrough in overcoming Hamas’ tunnel war to a single moment of enlightenment, but sees it as the result of hard, exhausting and continuous work.

While the soldiers of his 98th Division – which is almost considered a special unit – initially had to find their way slowly and awkwardly in the darkness of the Hamas tunnels, they eventually became, in his view, the first army in modern history to carry out large-scale invasions with entire units of troops, maneuvering through the entire Hamas tunnel network.

Dan Goldfus, a rising star in the Israeli army, inspects a Hamas terror tunnel in East Jabalya in the northern Gaza Strip. (Source: Israeli army spokesperson unit)

The magazine learned that in the early stages of the war, Goldfus’ troops had to focus on basic things like understanding the size, volume and depth of the tunnels. Likewise, they just had to get used to the look of the tunnels, dig into them, take photos and study them. Over time, this systematic approach helped them build more confidence.

Goldfus and his troops slowly explored different tunnel depths and studied the type of equipment Hamas used in different tunnels, but with very specific and defined objectives and missions.

WHEN HE and his troops went in, Goldfus, like a true soldier, insisted on entering a large number of the tunnels himself to see them up close, despite the additional risk to himself, since they usually did not yet know what to expect.

According to the magazine, they had a specific target for each area in question, usually starting with tunnels about which Goldfus had received more extensive information from the Shin Bet (Israeli domestic intelligence agency) and Israeli intelligence sources before the operation – especially if Hamas wanted to put more pressure on the Israeli army’s advance from a particular tunnel shaft.

Neither Goldfus nor any of the other generals initially allowed entire units to enter the tunnels. Even in early January, three months after the war began and a full month after the then brigadier general’s invasion of Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers rarely ventured into the tunnels.

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FINALLY, GOLDFUS realized that the Hamas tunnels were not separate systems but a single, vast decentralized network. He reached this conclusion when he and his top advisers spotted a convergence of trends.

The next step, diagnosing the convergence, was left to the special forces. Division 98 now took a slightly higher risk by entering the tunnels to maximize the benefit of taking over certain above-ground areas.

The special forces and engineers then began to examine the individual tunnel components in more detail. Goldfus admitted that this phase also took a very long time.

At the beginning of January, the commander of Division 98 and his troops finally achieved a breakthrough.

They had discussed and debated, sometimes all night long, as they conducted their operational assessment and developed a plan to capture the tunnels. According to the magazine, Goldfus and his team asked themselves: What risk should we take to explore the tunnels? What are they worth to the enemy?

All levels of command were involved, including IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, as entering the tunnels posed a great risk.

Eventually, Goldfus managed to understand what Hamas was doing and what it was not doing. Surprisingly, he realized that Hamas had not come to fight underground. It only wanted to use the tunnels for survival and recreation.

SUDDENLY GOLDFUS and his team began to see the tunnel question in a different light.

The Yahalom special unit, together with various commandos, entered the tunnels in larger numbers and more frequently, covering greater distances.

Subsequently, other “regular” infantry units moved in, such as the combat team of Unit 7, the soldiers of the Givati ​​Brigade and others.

To understand how the tunnels in different parts of Gaza are related, Goldfus believes it is only possible to do so after seeing a large number of different tunnels in different parts of Gaza. He points out that each tunnel has different nuances: for example, the doors built into the tunnel look different and the cement material used to surround the tunnel is different.

In his view, for example, anyone who saw the tunnels of Shifa Hospital at the beginning of the war was in some way misled or “deceived”.

Many in the Israeli army, focusing too much on Shifa, thought that all the tunnels the military later discovered were the same. Goldfus would call this a “major error” because many of the tunnels are different.

DAN GOLDFUS stands in the crater at the site of the former house of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza. (Source: YONAH JEREMY BOB)

In his view, the tunnels of Khan Yunis are different from the tunnels of Rafah, which are different from the tunnels of Jabalya, which are different from the tunnels of Shejaia. And in Khan Yunis and in each area there were different types of excavators.

According to Goldfus, some people thought he was crazy, but he was convinced that there was one giant network beneath their feet. These were not separate strategic tunnels, tactical tunnels, or separate areas. In his telling, it was one giant network that you could go around Erez in northern Gaza and come out at Rafah and Egypt – much like water seeping through a mountain and flowing back down.

Another analogy for the network of tunnels and the difficulty of finding one’s way through them that Goldfus likes to use comes from a scene in the 1987 film Space ballsa parody of star Warswhere stormtroopers are ordered to “comb” the desert for refugees. Then you see them literally “dragging” a huge comb through the vast desert to no avail.

A recent operation to recover the bodies of hostages took less than 24 hours from start to finish, partly because Goldfus had enough experience and information about the tunnels to plan all the details.

In his view, he could not have achieved this without all that the IDF had learned over time. This was a significant and complex operation, and the Major General felt that he and his team had accomplished something exceptionally significant.

All this ultimately led to the Israeli forces being able to launch simultaneous surface and underground attacks in mid- and late January.

Will all these breakthroughs help the Israeli army to destroy all of Hamas’ tunnels?

Goldfus took into account that the Israeli forces would not be able to penetrate all of the tunnels. Rather, they would succeed in destroying the critical mass of tunnels that, due to their proximity, pose a threat to the State of Israel, the magazine learned.

Moreover, the 98th Division commander believes the military will be able to blow up many kilometers of tunnels – and important connecting tunnels central to the Gaza network – even if it will never be able to destroy them all. That equation doesn’t bother Goldfus. He would suggest looking at the miles of Japanese World War II tunnels in Okinawa, many of which still exist.

If no one uses them, he believes the task is not in the tunnels themselves, but for the Israeli forces to kill or injure Hamas terrorists – and to convince the population of the Gaza Strip that they have alternatives: they do not want to be ruled by the terrorist group, they should not be used as human shields or cooperate with Hamas out of fear.

Goldfus disapproves of those who lack the patience to systematically destroy the tunnels. In his view, the Israeli forces must proceed systematically, developing and using sound knowledge to achieve maximum success in the shortest possible time.

In Shejaia, for example, his troops destroyed eight tunnels in just two weeks, the magazine learned. In other areas, however, his troops were not nearly as effective.

The Major General argues that the Israeli armed forces should continue to strive to intensify their efforts to rid the area as much as possible of the tunnel danger.

In his next assignment at Northern Command, Goldfus will focus primarily on various land forces, but will also work with the Air Force and others to fill gaps in the military’s air defenses. Although he hasn’t fully settled into his new position, he believes the legacy Vulcan anti-drone air defense system, if deployed, should remain the last line of defense.

In a recent interview, former Air Defense Chief Brigadier General (ret.) Ran Kochav said, magazine On the one hand, the Vulcan is not a panacea, but on the other hand, he believes it could help close some gaps in Israel’s current air defense, which is more focused on missile defense and less on drones.

Goldfus believes that the usefulness of the Vulcan systems is limited by their short-range capability, making it impractical to deploy them beyond Israel’s borders.

He believes it is difficult to play defensively and part of the solution is to go on the offensive and combat the drone threat.

This is hardly surprising considering that Goldfus began his career at the Shayetet 13 naval command. 



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